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Abstract: This paper uses a combination of VAR and bootstrapping techniques to 
analyze whether the exchange rates of some New Member States of the EU have been 
used as output stabilizers (those of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), during 
1993-2004. This question is important because it provides a prior evaluation on the 
costs and benefits involved in entering the European Monetary Union (EMU). Joining 
the EMU is not optional for these countries but mandatory, although there is no definite 
deadline. Therefore, if the exchange rate works as a shock absorber, monetary 
independence could be retained for a longer period. Our main finding is that the 
exchange rate could be a stabilizing tool in Poland and the Czech Republic, although in 
Hungary it appears to act as a propagator of shocks. In addition, in these three countries, 
demand and monetary shocks account for most of the variability in both nominal and 
real exchange rates. 
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Unlike Denmark, Sweden or the United Kingdom, the adoption of the euro is not an option for
the New Member States1 (NMS) of the European Union (EU), but an obligation. However, the
NMS can make decisons regarding the timing of this process. Joining the European Monetary
Union (EMU) involves the loss of control over the nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange
rate. At the same time, these countries will have to abide by the ￿scal discipline imposed by
the Maastricht convergence criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact2
Studies concerning the issue of the costs and bene￿ts of joining the EMU by the NMS are
normally motivated by at least one of the following complementary aspects. First, the size
of the country and the state of the restructuring process from socialism to a market-oriented
economy. Second, how well the business cycle synchronizes with that of the euro-zone and
especially that of Germany. This issue is deep within the theory on optimum currency areas, as
stated by Mundell (1961). Third, the degree to which these countries meet the requirements of
the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. Finally, whether the exchange rate
works as a shock absorber or if it is instead acting as a propagator of shocks.
Instead of analyzing the degree of business cycle synchronization, we will emphasize the role
of the exchange rate as a shock absorber for two reasons. On the one hand, business cycles
in these countries are not well synchronized with respect to those of other EU countries, and
especially that of Germany (see Camacho et al. (2005a) and references therein, or Darvas and
SzapÆry (2005)). Second, although labor mobility can work as an adjustment mechanism, it
has been restricted for up to 7 years. This makes labor mobility non-e⁄ective in countering
asymmetric shocks (see Fidrmuc (2004)). Our ￿ndings indicate that the exchange rates have
played the role of a shock absorber mainly in Poland and the Czech Republic and to a lesser
extent in Hungary. Hence, these countries may ￿nd it of value to wait for a longer time before
entering the EMU.
In particular, we will be deal with two main questions, namely, (i) whether the exchange rate
has actually served as a stabilization tool in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and (ii)
to what extent demand shocks are responsible for the real exchange rate ￿ uctuations. Although
these countries have shown little enthusiasm regarding joining the EMU (see Report 1397 of the
Commission (2005)), they have been chosen on the basis that they are the biggest and most
prominent new members of the EU, especially Poland.
In order to tackle these two questions we will proceed in a three-step manner. First, along the
lines proposed by Canzoneri et al. (1996), we use a 2-variable SVAR that includes the relative
output and nominal exchange rate to search for neutral and non-neutral shocks. For a group of
EU countries, Canzoneri et al. (1996) found that while non-neutral shocks explain most of the
variability in relative output, they explain little of the nominal exchange rate variability, where
1From May 1, 2004, these are Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
2Some economists have argued that Frank Baum￿ s tale The Wonderful Wizard of Oz presents an allegory of
the populist debate on the bimetallic monetary system that took place at the end of 19th century in the USA
(see Rocko⁄ (1990) or Mankiw (2001)). The populist view defended the thesis of a dual monetary standard based
on gold and silver, while opponents defended the established gold standard. Dorothy was told to follow a yellow
brick road (the gold standard), wearing a pair of silver shoes that enjoyed the power to take her home. In this
paper when we ask the question whether the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are following the yellow brick







neutral shocks dominate. They concluded that the exchange rate was not working as a shock
absorber.
Second, we apply the 3-variable SVAR suggested by Clarida and Gal￿ (1994) to identify
supply, demand and nominal shocks. Examples using a similar identi￿cation schedule are those
of Canzoneri et al. (1996), and those of Thomas (1997), and Bjłrnland (2004) for the cases
of Sweden and Norway, respectively, and Borghijs and Kuijs (2004) for the cases of the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland. Borghijs and Kuijs (2004) conclude that the exchange rates in
these countries could be amplifying the e⁄ects of some shocks over output. Hence, monetary
independence could be costly.
Third, in order to overcome the serious drawback of the small samples in these countries, the
stationary bootstrap method of Politis and Romanos (1994) will be adapted to the SVAR. This
method has been recently introduced into the econometric analysis by Camacho et al. (2005b)
to date cyclical turning points in small samples (including the ones of the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland). The stationary bootstrap makes it possible to numerically calculate the
probability distributions of the ratio in the structural variance decomposition. This is used as an
alternative method to assess the contribution of the exchange rate to stabilize output dynamics.
Our main ￿ndings are as follows: using the 2-variable SVAR, the exchange rate appears to
act as a destabilizing factor in the Czech Republic and Hungary, given that output and the
exchange rate are driven by di⁄erent types of shocks. In Poland there is some evidence that the
exchange rate can be a shock absorber. When using the 3-variable SVAR, we also ￿nd that the
exchange rate is not a shock absorber in Hungary, as in the previous analysis. However, in the
Czech Republic and Poland, the variance decomposition shows that the exchange rate could have
been a stabilizing factor. Finally, the stationary bootstrap allows us to measure the strength
to which the exchange rate works as a shock absorber. This technique shows that the exchange
rates have played an important role in addressing the shocks that drive output ￿ uctuations in
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland for the period under consideration, 1993-2004.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a brief sketch of the underlying theoret-
ical model. Section 3 provides an explanation of the data employed and some preliminary tests,
unit roots and structural break tests. Section 4 identi￿es the shocks a⁄ecting output and the
nominal exchange rate, using a bivariate SVAR. Section 5 uses a 3-variable SVAR that identi￿es
supply, demand and nominal shocks. Section 6 presents the stationary bootstrap method and
its application to the models obtained in the previous sections. Section 7 summarizes all our
results and compares them to those in the related literature and, ￿nally, Section 8 presents the
conclusions.
2. The model
We have borrowed the version of the Mundell-Flemming-Dornbusch model presented by Clarida
and Gal￿ (1994). In order to deal with the questions stated so far, only minor changes have been
introduced into the model. We will focus on four endogenous variables: output, real exchange
rate, prices and nominal exchange rate. With the exception of the interest rate, variables
represent the log of home levels relative to foreign levels. The model consists in an aggregate
demand function, an equation describing price-setting behavior, a demand-for-money equation









t = dt + ￿qt ￿ ￿ [it ￿ Et (￿t+1)]; (2.1)
pt = (1 ￿ ￿)Et￿1 (pe
t) + ￿pe
t; (2.2)
mt ￿ pt = yt ￿ ￿it; (2.3)
it = Et (st+1) ￿ st: (2.4)
Equation (2.1) is a standard open-economy IS equation in which the demand for home output
relative to foreign output, yd
t, depends positively on the relative demand shock dt, and the real
exchange rate, qt = st ￿ pt, where st is the nominal exchange rate and pt is the relative price.
It also depends negatively on the real interest rate di⁄erential, it ￿ Et (￿t+1); where ￿t+1 is
the relative rate of in￿ ation at t. Et (￿) is the standard operator for conditional expectations.
Equation (2.2) is the price-setting equation, where the actual price is a weighted average of the
expected market-clearing price, Et￿1 (pe
t); and the price that would actually clear the output
market, pe
t, with the superscript e denoting the long-run frictionless equilibrium level. When
￿ = 1, prices are fully ￿ exible. Equation (2.3) is the standard LM equation, where (relative) real
money demand, mt ￿ pt, depends positively on output and negatively on nominal interest rate.
Finally, equation (2.4) is the uncovered interest parity. ￿;￿;￿ and ￿ are positive parameters.
The stochastic processes that govern relative supply, ys
t, relative money, mt, and relative real













+ ￿dt￿1 + "d
t: (2.7)
Output and money, (2.5) and (2.6), are pure random walks, where "su
t and "n
t are i:i:d: normal
shocks. The real demand shock (2.7) is a⁄ected by three components. It negatively depends on
the growth rate of output, implying that ￿scal policy is counter-cyclical. At any time, there is
a systematic correction from the previous period realization (￿dt￿1, assuming that ￿ 2 (0;1)).




i.e., the supply shock, the real demand shock and the nominal shock, respectively.
The long-run rational expectations equilibrium is that of a fully ￿ exible-price (￿ = 1). Output
is inelastically supplied and equilibrium quantities and market clearing prices are
qe
t = ys
t=￿ ￿ ￿dt; (2.8)
pe
t = mt ￿ ys
t + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿dt; (2.9)
se
t = (1=￿ ￿ 1)ys
t + mt ￿ ￿dt; (2.10)
where ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿[1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
￿1, and ￿ ￿ [￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
￿1. The real exchange rate depreciates in
response to a supply disturbance and appreciates in respond to a real demand disturbance, but it
is left una⁄ected by nominal shocks in the long run. All three shocks in￿ uence the relative price
and the nominal exchange rate in the long run. A positive monetary shock produces a nominal








a supply shock on the nominal exchange rate is rather ambiguous. The nominal exchange rate
depreciates with demand shocks. As ￿scal policy is counter-cyclical, market traders anticipate a
￿scal contraction in response to a supply expansion, which permits reducing the nominal interest
rate.
In the short run, prices adjust sluggishly, as ￿ di⁄ers from 1.3 Markets do not clear and real
























: in the long run, output is solely a⁄ected by the supply shock and the
real exchange rate is not a⁄ected by the nominal shock. These three long-run restrictions su¢ ce
for identi￿cation. Variables are not constrained in the short run.
3. Data description, unit roots and structural break tests
We use monthly observations for Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, from
1993.01 to 2004.12, taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics Database (henceforth
IFS) and Eurostat. The industrial production index is used as a proxy for output (line 66
at IFS), and the consumption price index as a proxy for price (line 64 at IFS). The nominal
exchange rate is the bilateral euro exchange rate (Eurostat). Real exchange rates are calculated
by combining the bilateral euro exchange rate and the consumer price indexes. Although most
of these data are available from 1990-91, these countries went through most of their transition
process from socialism to a market-oriented economy, as measured in terms of output losses,
during 1990-1993 (Salvatore (2004)). This is why we prefer our sample period to start in 1993.
The TRAMO-SEATS software package is used to extract the trend-cycle components of the
series of output, prices and the real exchange rate (the seasonal and the irregular components
are removed). All variables have been transformed into logarithms.
A variety of stationarity tests are performed to check whether the speci￿cation of equations
should be written as ￿rst di⁄erences. Table 1 presents some unit root tests for the data. The
results indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for all the series against
the alternative hypothesis of stationarity around a deterministic trend. Both the Augmented
Dickey Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips Perron (PP) test statistics are smaller than the 10% critical
value for all the series in levels. Therefore, we conclude that the series are non-stationary. To
con￿rm that a ￿rst di⁄erence induces stationarity in these variables, test statistics for ￿rst
di⁄erences are also computed. Except for the relative price in some particular cases, the test
statistics are greater than their respective 10% critical values, con￿rming that the variables are
integrated for order 1 and that a ￿rst di⁄erence su¢ ces for stationarity. The non-stationarity
of the real exchange rates implies that the PPP hypothesis does not hold, although conditions
for PPP are too restrictive to be met in transition economies (Dibooglu and Kutan (2001)).
Table 1 here: Unit Roots
Figures 1-4 about here
Figures 1 through 4 show some descriptive representations. The output growth rate is
represented in Figure 1. Visual inspection of the output series reveals that expansions are shorter









and recessions are longer for Germany than for any of these countries, especially Hungary and
Poland (see Camacho et al. (2005b)). On the other hand, Camacho et al. (2005a) estimate
the degree of synchronization between European economies using a variety of techniques and
observations for the industrial production index. In view of their estimations, only the Hungarian
cycle can be said to be well synchronized or symmetric with respect to the German business cycle
(see also Csermely (2004), Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2004) and Korhonen (2003)). The evidence
is unclear regarding the existence of a common business cycle between Germany and the Czech
Republic or Poland. Prices are much more stable in Germany than in the three other countries
(see Figure 2). These countries have experienced a considerable disin￿ ation from values well
above the 10% until values around the 5% throughout the period. Figure 3 shows the nominal
rate of depreciation for the Czech Koruna, the Hungarian Forint and the Polish Zloty. The
series present changes in exchange ￿ exibility as being due to alterations in the exchange rate
policy or the monetary policy framework. In particular, the ￿rst third in the series of the Czech
Koruna might suggest a break in the exchange ￿ exibility. This issue will be revisited in the
next paragraph given that the validity of the analysis rests on the assumption of exchange rate
￿ exibility. Finally, Figure 4 plots the real exchange rate. The series for the Czech Republic
and Poland re￿ ect continuous competitiveness losses, whereas the series for Hungary show a
sustained real exchange rate until the middle of 1999 and later on a real depreciation of about
25%.
Some papers in the related literature argue that the length of these series should be limited
to a period of homogeneous exchange rate ￿ exibility. This is motivated by de jure changes
in the exchange or monetary regimes (see Dibooglu and Kutan (2001), Borghijs and Kuijs
(2004) or Jones and Kutan (2004)). Instead of assuming that de jure regime changes necessarily
motivate de facto changes, we now test for possible structural breaks in the time series of nominal
exchange rates to directly check for de facto changes in regime. We argue that a longer period of
observations can be incorporated into the regressions, thus increasing robustness to the results.
To this end, we follow the same approach to testing structural breaks as used by McConnell
and PØrez-Quir￿s (2000) and Camacho (2004). The nominal depreciation rate is assumed to be
governed by an AR(1) process
￿st = ￿ + ￿￿st￿1 + et: (3.1)
If the error term et is normally distributed,
p
￿=2jb etj is an unbiased estimator of the standard








0 if t ￿ T
1 if t > T
D2t = 1 ￿ D1t;
where T is the estimated break-point. If ￿1 = ￿2, the volatility of ￿st does not su⁄er alterations
in T. Therefore, one cannot accept a structural change at T. We use the approach suggested
by Hansen (2000) for the p￿values of the supremum tests developed in Andrews (1993) and the








that ￿1 = ￿2. The results are shown in Table 2. The ￿rst row presents the T￿date for which
the likelihood ratio test is maximum, that is, where the probability for a structural break is
the highest one. Except for the case of the Czech Republic, the p￿values of the supremum and
average tests are well above the 5% critical value. The null hypothesis of no structural change
cannot be rejected for Hungary and Poland. Some possible limiting cases for the Czech Republic
can be pointed out, where a de￿nite rejection of the null hypothesis could only be done using
the p￿value of the exponential test.
Interestingly, the possible breaks identi￿ed coincide with those provided in Begg (1998),
Borghijs and Kuijs (2004) or Dibooglu and Kutan (2001): the Czech Republic adopted a ￿7:5%
target zone band in February 1996. The adoption of a managed ￿ oat and the exchange rate
crisis, in￿ uenced by the Asian crisis, in May 1997 may also have had some in￿ uence on the
turndown of the p￿values by April 1996. As regards Hungary, on March 1995 the central parity
of the Forint was realigned by 9% and a ￿2:25% band was adopted. However, previous tests
seem to be una⁄ected by some other alterations of monetary policy, such as the widening of the
target zone bands to ￿15% in May 2001. Finally, Poland widened the exchange rate ￿ uctuation
band to ￿10% in February 1998, perhaps the closest monetary episode to our possibly identi￿ed
structural break in April 1997, but the widening of the bands to ￿7% in May 1995 does not
seem to have in￿ uenced the results of our tests.
Summarizing, we consider it unnecessary to shorten the length of the sample on the basis
of de jure or o¢ cial changes in the exchange regime. Instead, we will follow the results from
Table 2 on the basis that de facto changes in the exchange regime have not been observed. This
strategy of sample selection allows us to use a longer period of observations, from 1993.01 to
2004.12, containing a greater number of business cycle ￿ uctuations. Exchange rate ￿ exibility
has been the same in these three countries across this period.
Table 2 here: Structural Breaks
4. Neutral versus non-neutral shocks
This section analyzes whether the output and the nominal exchange rate are driven by shocks
of the same nature. A conventional starting point is to use a bivariate VAR, containing relative
output and the nominal exchange rate, as proposed by Canzoneri et al. (1996). Two orthogonal
shocks, a non-neutral and a neutral one, are assumed to drive the economy. The model in the
previous section states that long-run properties can be used as restrictions to identify these
shocks. Basically, output is assumed to be exclusively led by the non-neutral shock in the long
run. Canzoneri et al. (1996) do not clarify what neutral or non-neutral shocks really mean. A
natural tentative interpretation is to map non-neutral shocks onto real shocks, that is, the supply
side shock and the real demand shock. By default, the nominal shock is mapped onto the neutral
one. Note, however, that the model in Section 2 cannot motivate such a recursive identi￿cation.
On the other hand, the vector used could involve neglecting important information to make
proper projections.
Using standard notation, the VAR model consists of ￿xt = ￿[yt;st]
0, where ￿xt is a vector
of stationary endogenous variables, yt denotes the domestic output relative to German output,
and st the nominal exchange rate of the home currency versus the euro. ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ L) is the








structural interpretation given by:
￿xt = C(L)"t (4.1)
where "t = ["nn
t ;"n
t ]
0, is a vector of structural shocks. Following the terminology in Canzoneri et
al (1996), "nn
t is interpreted as the non-neutral shock and "n
t as the neutral shock. "t is serially
uncorrelated and E ("t"0
t) = I. C (0) is a (2 ￿ 2) matrix de￿ning the contemporaneous structural
relationship between the two variables in the system. Structural shocks are not observed directly.
Instead, they are recovered from the moving average representation:
￿xt = A(L)ut (4.2)
where ut are non-orthogonal prediction errors, i.e. E (utut) = ￿, and A(0) = I. Equations (4.1)
and (4.2) imply a linear relationship between "t and ut:
ut = C0"t
It follows that C (L) = A(L)C0, and the long-run representation of (4.1) is given by C (1) =
A(1)C0. Now, the following long-run identifying restriction will be imposed: the neutral shock





The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test reveals that an order of 10 lags seems appropriate in the
three cases. Table 3 shows the prediction error variance decomposition for relative output and
the nominal exchange rate. Percentages refer to the fraction which can be attributed to each
shock, for 1 and 48 months ahead. From this table, we highlight the following results. First,
for the Czech Republic and Hungary, most of the variability in relative output (above 90%)
can be associated with the non-neutral shock, whereas the nominal exchange rate variability is
mostly determined by neutral shocks (just the reverse fraction, above 90%). Hence, for these
two countries, the results suggest that the nominal exchange rate does not respond to the shocks
that seem to cause the bulk of ￿ uctuations in relative output. This gives preliminary evidence
that the exchange rate does not serve as a shock absorber. Second, concerning Poland, the
neutral shock explains about 30% of the variability in the nominal exchange rate. Compared
with output variability, we ￿nd evidence that output and the exchange rate would be sharing
shocks of the same nature. Something similar is found in Borghijs and Kuijs (2004).
Figure 5 plots the impulse response of the level of the variables. We can observe how real
shocks account for most of the changes in relative outputs and have permanent e⁄ects for the
three countries. Given the long-run restriction, the e⁄ect of nominal shocks has a smaller e⁄ect
on relative outputs and tend to die out over time. On the other hand, nominal shocks lead
to a long-run depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. In the case of the Czech Republic
exchange rate, we obtain evidence of overshooting, provided that nominal shocks lead to an
initial depreciation of the exchange rate which is subsequently reversed as the exchange rate
moves downwards regarding its trend level. On the other hand, non-neutral shocks depreciate
the exchange rate in the case of Hungary and Poland, but appreciate the exchange rate in the
case of the Czech Republic. This is consistent with the result derived from theoretical models
that the e⁄ect of a supply shock on the nominal exchange rate is ambiguous.
Finally, the estimated bivariate structure could be used to support the idea that joining the
EMU is bene￿cial in the Czech Republic and Hungary. Monetary independence is costly as the








this bivariate analysis is that the economy is subject to several types of shocks. The nominal
exchange rate variability can be due to demand or monetary shocks. A positive monetary
shock should depreciate the nominal exchange rate and increase relative output in the short
run, whereas a positive real demand shock would appreciate the nominal exchange rate and
increase relative output in the short run. Therefore, a nominal depreciation can be explained
by a positive monetary shock or by a negative real demand shock.
Table 3 here: Bivariate VAR
Figure 5 about here
5. Supply, demand and nominal shocks
In this Section we apply the 3-variable SVAR suggested by Clarida and Gal￿ (1994). The vector
of variables ￿xt = ￿[yt;qt;st]
0, where qt represents the real exchange rate, now enables the







, the supply shock, the real demand shock and the
nominal shock. The reduced form of the structural model can be written as:
￿xt = A(L)C (0)"t = C (L)"t;
and the long-run speci￿cation is again given by C (1) = A(1)C (0). According to the theoretical
model, we identify the supply shock as the only one in the system which can a⁄ect output in
the long run, hence C12 (1) = C13 (1) = 0. In the long run, nominal shocks do not a⁄ect the
real exchange rate, hence C23 (1) = 0. These three restrictions allow for an exact Cholesky
identi￿cation.
Using the Likelihood Ratio (LR) we conclude that 12 lags are appropriate for the Czech
Republic and Poland, and 13 lags for Hungary. The variance decomposition is shown in Table
4 and Figure 6 plots the impulse-response functions, from which we highlight the following
conclusions.
Supply shocks. A positive supply shock has the expected e⁄ect on output in all three coun-
tries. The impact on exchange rates is ambiguous, a result stated by the model. For instance,
in the Czech Republic the nominal exchange rates have a sustained permanent appreciation in
response to a positive supply shock. As relative prices sluggishly decrease, the real exchange
appreciates in the short run but adjusts upward as time goes by. For Hungary and Poland, a
positive supply shock makes the exchange rates depreciate. Regarding the variance decomposi-
tion analysis, the supply shock is responsible for most of output variability, mainly in Hungary
(90%) and in the Czech Republic (60%). We coincide with Borghijs and Kuijs (2004) in that
the supply shock has a lesser e⁄ect in Poland, where demand shocks, real plus nominal, account
for around 55% of output variability. On the other hand, supply shocks are very important in
explaining the real exchange rate variability in Poland (60%), in the Czech Republic (30%), and
are of minor importance in Hungary (10%). A similar pattern is observed in nominal exchange
rate variability.
Demand shocks. Real demand shocks have the expected impact on relative output and the
exchange rate. In the Czech Republic and Poland, real appreciation is stronger than nominal
appreciation. Thus, the nominal exchange rate softens the impact of the demand shock on output








the idea that the exchange rate is not doing the right job is strengthened (in accordance with
our previous ￿nding using the bivariate structure).
Nominal shocks. In response to a positive nominal shock, output performs in a di⁄erent
manner in the three countries: it has a transitory increase in the Czech Republic, it is negligible
in Hungary, and it has a negative but small impact in Poland (where the nominal shock has
probably not been properly identi￿ed). Real exchange rates have a temporary depreciation in the
Czech Republic and Poland (i.e. Dornbusch￿ s overshooting). Prices might be responding more
rapidly in Hungary than in the Czech Republic or Poland in response to a positive nominal shock.
As the price e⁄ect could overcome the e⁄ect from the nominal exchange rate, this makes the real
exchange rates adjust downward. Hence, nominal shocks induce a real appreciation in Hungary,
a further sign that the nominal exchange rate is not dampening these shocks on competitiveness.
Nominal exchange rates exhibit a permanent depreciation in response to positive nominal shocks.
In Hungary, a positive nominal shock has the immediate impact of a transitory appreciation.
Shock absorption. For the Czech Republic, at 6 to 12 periods ahead, output and exchange
rate appear to be a⁄ected by a reasonably similar structure, which is a sign that the exchange
rate has been able to soften some of the ￿ uctuations that have a⁄ected output in the short run.
This contradicts the conclusion obtained for the Czech Republic from the bivariate structure.
For Hungary, whereas the supply shock explains most of the variability in relative output (about
90%), this only accounts for a small fraction in the nominal exchange rate variability (about
10%). Consequently, the exchange rate could be amplifying shocks in the Hungarian economy
at any time horizon ahead. For Poland, the exchange rate seems to accommodate an important
fraction of the same shocks responsible for output variability, a ￿nding that agrees with that
from the previous bivariate structure.
Real exchange rate variability. Nominal shocks account for an important fraction in the real
exchange rate in the Czech Republic and Hungary, 50% and 45%, respectively, but the e⁄ect
of these shocks is much smaller in Poland, 12%. This sharply contrasts with the 2-variable
analysis of Dibooglu and Kutan (2001) who found that the real exchange rate variability was
mainly explained by nominal shocks in Poland, whereas in Hungary most of this variability
should be associated with real shocks. In the Czech Republic and Hungary, demand shocks
(i.e. real plus nominal) amount to a total fraction of about 72% and 90%, respectively, of
the real exchange rate variability. This weight is much smaller for Poland (40%). As long as
these demand shocks are related to government policies, the costs of joining the EMU can be
minimized in the Czech Republic and Hungary.
Table 4 here: 3-variable VAR
Figure 6 about here
6. Stationary bootstraps
The structural decompositions presented in the previous sections su⁄er from the unavailability of
su¢ ciently large samples. This important drawback also a⁄ects most (if not all) of the works in
the related literature: the results are not robust due to the limited size of the samples (see inter
alii Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2004), Borghijs and Kuijs (2003) or Dibooglu and Kutan (2001)).
There are two issues associated with this problem. First, statistical inference is nearly impossible








enough to allow for imposing long-run structural restrictions. At best, the VAR is drawing
information from a sample that only contains about three cycles, which is clearly insu¢ cient
to impose such restrictions. Camacho et al. (2005b) estimate that expansions last about 22
to 24 months for Germany, 30 ￿ 36 months for the Czech Republic, 44 months for Hungary
and 40 ￿ 41 months for Poland. They also ￿nd that recessions last about 12 to 14 months for
Germany, 12 ￿ 13 months for the Czech Republic, 8 months for Hungary and 8 ￿ 9 months for
Poland (see Figure 1).
Recently, Camacho et al. (2005b) have adapted the stationary bootstrap method proposed
by Politis and Romano (1994) to the analysis of business cycle characteristics, in order to deal
with the problem of a short time series. This method consists in generating pseudo-time series
that preserve the same autocorrelation structure as the original data. Random samples are
generated for the time subindex t at ￿xt. Series are bootstrapped in blocks, where the ￿rst
observation in each block is drawn from a discrete uniform distribution on f1;2;:::Tg, with
replacement, where T is the sample size, and the block length ‘ is randomly sampled from a
geometric distribution. Let tj be the ￿rst observation of the j￿th block, bj, and call ‘j the
length of block bj. Summarizing, blocks are generated by
bj = [tj;tj + 1;:::;tj + minfT;tj + ‘jg];
where Pr[t = tj] = T￿1; for tj = 1;2;:::T,
‘j ￿ G (p); with p 2 [0;1];
where Pr[‘ = ‘j] = G (p) = (1 ￿ p)p‘j￿1; for ‘j = 1;2;:::.
for j = 1;:::J. G (p) is the geometric probability law. Then, blocks are stacked into a vector
B = [bj]
J
j=1, constrained to have a length of T. Index B reorders the original index f1;:::Tg.








Next, we calculate the SVAR decomposition from the bootstrapped vector. This process is
iterated 15,000 times. Regarding parameter p at the geometric distribution, note that the mean
is given by E (‘) = (1 ￿ p)
￿1, which represents the unconditional expected length of a block
bj. The sample analogue for this length is the observed mean length of expansions. We borrow
from Camacho et al. (2005b) their calculated mean time length for expansions and adjust p
accordingly: 33 months for the Czech Republic, 44 months for Hungary and 41 months for
Poland.
Table 6 presents results for the bootstrapped 2-variable decomposition, for 24 periods ahead
and 10 lags in all cases. Some relevant statistics are presented in the top panel of Table 6, as
well as the results from the original sample. Means and medians are reasonably similar and, for
the Czech Republic and Hungary, the original decompositions seem to be robust in relation to
this bootstrap analysis. The bootstraps results for Poland reveal that non-neutral shocks a⁄ect
output variance even more, and exchange rate variance even less, than the original sample series.
For a given time horizon ahead, call !y
nn the proportion of the relative output variance
accounted for the non-neutral shocks, and call !s
nn the proportion of the nominal exchange rate
variance accounted for the non-neutral shocks. Thus, let similar notations hold for the shares
from the neutral shocks, i.e. !y
n and !s
n, such that !y
nn + !y
n = 1, and !s
nn + !s








example, Canzoneri et al. (1996) argue that the exchange rate works as a shock absorber if it
addresses the shocks that lead output. This hypothesis is tested by checking whether they have




How much distance should one tolerate on (!y
nn ￿ !s
nn) to admit that the exchange rate is
accommodating the shocks that a⁄ect output? The absolute value of (!y
nn ￿ !s
nn) is constrained
to the interval [0;1], from full stabilization to destabilization. Using stationary bootstraps,
the lower panel of Table 6 presents a numerical computation of the probability distribution of
j!y
nn ￿ !s




For instance, the probability that !y
nn and !s
nn di⁄er no more than 30% is 0:0044 in the Czech
Republic, 0:1220 in Hungary and 0:5337 in Poland. One needs an 80% tolerance between !y
nn
and !s
nn to accept, at least in half the cases, that the exchange rate is serving as a shock absorber
in the Czech Republic. Such a tolerance is of about 70% in the case of Hungary, but only a 30%
in Poland. Therefore, using the 2-variable bootstrapped decomposition, we con￿rm that there is
evidence that the exchange rate is not a shock absorber in the Czech Republic and Hungary,
but we do ￿nd evidence that it is a shock absorber in Poland.
Table 5: Bootstrapped 2-variable VAR
Notwithstanding the above, the bivariate SVAR has been criticized on the basis that it can be
a⁄ected by serious misspeci￿cation biases, as the vector does not take all the relevant available
information into account to make the projections. We also apply the stationary bootstraps
method to the trivariate SVAR. VAR orders are 12 lags for the Czech Republic and Poland
and 13 lags for Hungary. The time horizon is 12 periods ahead. Results for the bootstrapped
3-variable decomposition are presented in Tables 7 and 8. Table 7 provides descriptive statistics
from the bootstraps as well as a reference line to the results from the original sample (see Table
4). We ￿nd important di⁄erences between the original and the bootstrapped decompositions.
An important di⁄erence appears in the real exchange rate variability. Real demand shocks
account for half the real exchange rate variability and nominal shocks account for just a quarter.
Provided that these demand shocks are related to ￿scal and monetary policies, the costs of joining
the EMU can be controlled in these countries. Most of the variability in the real exchange rates
is associated with real shocks, i.e. supply shocks plus real demand shocks. Our bootstrapped
results can now be partially reconciled with those of Dibooglu and Kutan (2001): we agree that
real shocks account for most of the real exchange rate ￿ uctuations in Hungary, but we do not
agree that nominal shocks account for most of the real exchange rate ￿ uctuations in Poland. In
the latter case, the divergence can be due to several issues. First, the sample of observations is
di⁄erent: they use monthly data from 1990:01 to 1999:03, whereas we consider the period from
1993:01 to 2004:12. Second, whereas they use a 2-variable SVAR, our conclusions are extracted
from a 3-variable SVAR. As regards the real exchange rate, our ￿ndings resemble more those of
Borghijs and Kuijs (2004) than those of Dibooglu and Kutan (2001). In accounting for relative








underestimated in the Czech Republic, overestimated in Hungary, whereas the results for Poland
are not substantially di⁄erent.
In the bootstrapped identi￿cation, the contribution of the nominal shock in explaining output
variability is smaller than the original case. Nominal shocks explain about 25% ￿ 30% in real
exchange rate variances: compared to the original case, this is less in the Czech Republic and
Hungary but a bit more in Poland. Real demand shocks continue to explain an important
fraction of real exchange rates variability.
Next, for 12 periods ahead, call !z
j the proportion of variable z variability accounted by




j = 1. Again, we wonder to what extent output and nominal exchange rate are hit by
the same shocks. The ￿rst column of Table 8 gives tolerance levels varying from 5% to 100%.














￿ ￿ ￿ tolerance
￿
;
for j = su, d, n. For example, in the Czech Republic the probability that !y
su diverges from !s
su
by no more than 30% is 0:206. Provided that this probability is quite low, this indicates that
the supply shock does not a⁄ect output and the nominal exchange rate in a similar manner.
We conclude that the exchange rate is not very helpful in smoothing the supply ￿ uctuations.
However, provided that the di⁄erence j!
y
d ￿ !s
dj being smaller than 35% is observed 70% of times,
and the di⁄erence j!y
n ￿ !s
nj being smaller than 35% is observed 60% of times, we conclude that
the exchange rate might be a useful tool in the absorption of both the real demand and the
nominal demand shock.
For Hungary, although there is little evidence that the exchange rate is accommodating real
shocks, there appear some signs that the exchange rate could be strongly used for addressing
nominal shocks. For Poland, we again ￿nd evidence that the exchange rate works as an important
stabilization tool. In fact, the di⁄erence j!y
n ￿ !s
nj being smaller than 20% is observed 50% of
times.
Tables 6 and 7 here: Bootstrapped 3-variable VAR
7. Summary of results and implications
This Section combines the results obtained in previous Sections with those from the related
literature and the Convergence Report 2004 (European Central Bank (2004)) in order to evaluate
how well prepared these countries are to adopt the Euro.
The Convergence Report 2004 examines the state of economic convergence of New Member
States. Over the past 2 years, harmonized in￿ ation in the three countries has been relatively
low. Over the reference period used in the Convergence Report 2004 (from September 2003
to August 2004), the reference value for in￿ ation was 2:4%. Only the Czech Republic had a
harmonized in￿ ation rate below that reference value (1:8%), whereas Poland was slightly above
it (2:5%). Hungary was considerably above the reference value (6:5%). However, since around
mid-2003, there has been a rising trend in in￿ ation rates in the three countries (see Figure 2).
In July 2004, the Council viewed de￿cits ratios in these countries as excessive and issued
a recommendation to each of them. Di⁄erent deadlines, from 2005 to 2008, were set for their








of the authorities regarding participation in the EMU. In December 2004, the Commission
considered that the Czech Republic and Poland had taken e⁄ective action in response to the
Council recommendation, in particular with respect to the 2005 de￿cit target set in the May
2004 convergence programs, but not for Hungary. The three countries exhibited debt ratios
below the 60% reference value. However, the debt ratio increased substantially in the Czech
Republic and Poland, whereas in Hungary this wanders around the very limit.
In 2001 and 2002, long-term interest rates were on a broad downward trend in the three
countries, moving towards the euro area level. However, during 2003, this trend reversed and
the long-run interest rate started to diverge. The increase in long-term interest rates was due
to increasing in￿ ationary pressures and ￿scal uncertainty. With a reference value of 6:4%; in
the Czech Republic, the long-term interest rate is below the reference value (4:7%), whereas in
Poland this is very close to the reference value (6:9%). In Hungary, the long-term interest rate
is well above (8:1%).
Finally, none of the countries participated in ERM II during the last 2 years. According
to the Convergence Report 2004, the exchange rates exhibit a high degree of volatility partly
related to uncertainties regarding the outlook for ￿scal policy.
Another important point is the level of synchrony of the business cycle. The Czech Republic
presents a business cycle dominated by asymmetric shocks (see Camacho et al. (2005a), Darvas
and SzapÆry (2005) or Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2004)). The use of VAR techniques has not
yielded conclusive results. The bivariate VAR from Section 4 as well as the bootstrapped
one from Section 6 indicate that the exchange rate is not probably doing the right job. The
trivariate analysis shows that the exchange rate might be addressing the bulk of the ￿ uctuations
that govern output, especially those coming from the demand side of the economy. Real demand
shocks account for half the ￿ uctuations in the real exchange rate. As long as these shocks are
related to controllable demand policies, this indicates that adoption of the euro would not be
very costly. A fraction of about 3=4 of output ￿ uctuations are due to supply shocks, whereas
nominal shocks do not seem to cause serious output destabilization. Therefore, as a monetary
union implies that these nominal shocks would disappear, joining the EMU should not raise
much fear of losing monetary independence.
Hungarian cycles are well synchronized with respect to those of the euro-zone and that of
Germany (see Camacho et al. (2005a), Darvas and SzapÆry (2005), Csermely (2004), Fidrmuc
and Korhonen (2004) or Korhonen (2003)). On the other hand, both the 2- and the 3-variable
SVAR suggest that the exchange rate behaves as a propagator rather than an absorber of shocks.
Application of the bootstrapped techniques corroborate these ￿ndings. In addition, as nominal
shocks seem to be producing the large bulk of the ￿ uctuations in the real exchange rate, we ￿nd
that the nominal exchange rate has been strongly addressing these sort of shocks on output.
Given that most of the nominal shocks would vanish under a monetary union and provided that
real demand shocks help to explain about 60% of the real exchange rate, these results indicate
that joining the EMU could not be very costly for Hungary. In contrast, Jones and Kutan (2004)
have found that the Hungarian economy is highly sensitive to shifts in German monetary policy,
a ￿nding that would lead to recommending maintaining some degree of monetary independence
for some time.
Poland is the biggest country among the new Member States. Evidence is unclear regarding
whether its business cycle moves like those of euro-zone countries (see Camacho et al. (2005a)








been found to address a considerable fraction of those shocks driving the output. Supply shocks
have a lower e⁄ect on output in Poland, where demand shocks (real and nominal) account for
around 55% of output variability. Real demand shocks explain about 30-40% of movements in
the real exchange rate, whereas this fraction is 11-23% for nominal shocks. Borowski (2004),
considering a wider variety of pros and cons regarding joining the EMU, concludes that adoption
of the euro in Poland is likely to be bene￿cial. The exchange rate is, however, viewed as a source
of shocks and a destabilizing factor (see also the report of the National Bank of Poland (2004)).
In contrast, based on our results, we conclude that the exchange rate has been doing the right
job in Poland.
Table 9 groups all these results together. In the sub-panel labelled ￿Number of convergence
criteria (out of 5)￿ , we group the number of convergence criteria met by each country. Thus, the
Czech Republic is the closest to the Maastricht criteria, whereas Hungary is furthest. The general
impression is that exchange rate ￿ exibility has been wisely used to accommodate domestic
imbalances.
Table 8 here: Summary of results
8. Conclusions
In this paper we use the SVAR approach to study the possible gains from joining the European
Monetary Union for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, focusing on the role of the ex-
change rate as a shock absorber. An important caveat has to be borne in mind when assessing
such results obtained from SVAR techniques and those coming from previous and subsequent
literature: these analyses are based on the imposition of long-run restrictions on the structural
representation while using samples of limited size. This casts considerable doubt on the robust-
ness of the results. In an attempt to overcome the important drawback of small samples, we
have proposed an alternative criterion that helps to quantify how weak or strong the degree of
shock absorption is, based on stationary bootstraps.
Our bootstrapped analysis shows that exchange rates have been used as a shock absorber
during the period under consideration 1993-2004, mainly in Poland and the Czech Republic, and
to a lesser extent in Hungary. Although this result is more evident in Poland than in the Czech
Republic or Hungary, the techniques applied here have revealed that in these two last cases the
exchange rates have been accommodating shocks coming from the demand side of the economy.
These countries may ￿nd it of value to wait for a longer period before entering the EMU.
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y t 0,05 0,13 -1,02 -1,54 -2,48 -2,10
∆y t -2,68 * -2,68 * -4,4 *** -4,07 *** -3,14 ** -4,56 ***
s t -1,70 -2,74 -1,01 -0,80 -2,47 -2,24
∆s t -9,81 *** -10,26 *** -7,75 *** -7,90 *** -7,99 *** -7,79 ***
q t -2,59 -2,74 -2,93 -2,33 -2,20 -1,77
∆q t -10,36 *** -10,26 *** -9,08 *** -8,76 *** -8,23 *** -7,83 ***
p t -0,11 -0,16 -0,91 0,04 -3,06 -4,45
∆p t -3,04 ** -7,61 *** -1,52 -2,66 * -1,87 -3,79 ***








The number of lags used in the ADF test is determined by selecting the highest lag with a 
significant t-value on the last lag. A constant and a time trend are included in the regression for
levels. A constant is included when testing for first differences. Critical values (1%, 5% and 
10%) are taken from MacKinnon (1996): Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron without trend (-3.47,
-2.88, -2.57). Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron with trend (-4.02, -3.44, -3.14).
*: Rejection of the unit root hypothesis at the 10% level. 
** :Rejection of the unit root hypothesis at the 5% level.
***: Rejection of the unit root hypothesis at the 1% level.
 
Czech Hungary Poland
Possible break 1996 April 1995 May 1997 April
p-supremum 0,066 0,900 0,309
p-exponential 0,033 0,670 0,175
p-average 0,080 0,640 0,168








Country Horizon Non-Neutral Neutral Non-Neutral Neutral
Czech Rep. 1 97,99% 2,01% 11,22% 88,78%
48 93,92% 6,08% 12,96% 87,04%
Hungary 1 91,80% 8,20% 6,98% 93,02%
48 87,62% 12,38% 15,85% 84,15%
Poland 1 31,68% 68,32% 67,79% 32,21%
48 47,55% 52,45% 69,08% 30,92%












Table 4: Trivariate SVAR
Horizon Supply Demand Nominal Supply Demand Nominal Supply Demand Nominal
1 46,8% 21,1% 32,1% 27,3% 19,4% 53,4% 55,1% 2,1% 42,9%
6 45,7% 19,7% 34,6% 26,9% 19,4% 53,8% 52,2% 4,7% 43,1%
8 50,7% 18,6% 30,7% 25,2% 23,0% 51,8% 49,4% 6,5% 44,2%
12 59,2% 15,5% 25,3% 27,5% 20,4% 52,1% 48,2% 6,9% 44,9%
24 60,9% 13,4% 25,6% 27,9% 23,1% 49,1% 47,3% 7,2% 45,5%
36 61,7% 13,1% 25,1% 28,0% 24,3% 47,7% 47,2% 7,4% 45,4%
48 62,1% 13,0% 24,9% 27,8% 25,2% 47,0% 47,1% 7,6% 45,3%
Horizon Supply Demand Nominal Supply Demand Nominal Supply Demand Nominal
1 90,98% 8,03% 0,99% 0,72% 50,95% 48,33% 2,15% 80,81% 17,03%
6 95,16% 4,27% 0,57% 4,81% 52,20% 42,99% 10,51% 71,56% 17,93%
8 95,64% 3,83% 0,54% 5,06% 52,13% 42,80% 11,66% 71,54% 16,79%
12 94,12% 4,61% 1,27% 7,61% 49,48% 42,92% 13,47% 66,42% 20,11%
24 92,13% 5,67% 2,20% 9,37% 45,91% 44,72% 13,52% 65,35% 21,13%
36 91,75% 5,88% 2,37% 9,49% 44,35% 46,17% 13,83% 64,66% 21,50%
48 91,66% 5,89% 2,45% 9,50% 43,31% 47,19% 13,97% 64,36% 21,67%
Horizon Supply Demand Nominal Supply Demand Nominal Supply Demand Nominal
1 30,9% 12,1% 57,0% 60,2% 35,0% 4,8% 68,3% 15,0% 16,8%
6 40,5% 15,7% 43,8% 64,3% 27,6% 8,1% 70,8% 12,4% 16,8%
8 41,7% 15,5% 42,8% 63,2% 26,8% 10,0% 70,2% 12,3% 17,5%
12 45,8% 18,1% 36,1% 61,3% 27,4% 11,2% 68,4% 13,8% 17,8%
24 44,8% 16,7% 38,5% 59,3% 28,8% 11,9% 66,2% 15,0% 18,8%
36 44,9% 16,8% 38,4% 58,8% 28,6% 12,6% 66,1% 15,0% 18,9%
48 44,9% 16,8% 38,3% 58,7% 28,6% 12,7% 66,0% 15,0% 18,9%
Poland  (VAR(12))
Output Real Exchange Rate Nominal Exchange Rate
Real Exchange Rate Nominal Exchange Rate
Czech Republic (VAR(12))
Hungary  (VAR(13))



















Mean 92,8% 15,1% 83,3% 24,6% 75,0% 48,6%
Median 94,4% 13,4% 87,5% 20,6% 76,0% 49,6%
Original case 93,9% 12,9% 90,0% 16,4% 47,3% 70,6%
Maximum 99,8% 59,1% 99,5% 95,0% 99,1% 90,2%
Minimum 37,2% 1,5% 7,6% 2,3% 25,2% 4,4%


























































































Bivariate vector is bootstrapped with 15000 replications. Shares refer to a 24 











Table 6: Bootstrapped trivariate VAR (variance decomposition)
Supply Demand Nominal Supply Demand Nominal Supply Demand Nominal
Mean 73,2% 9,5% 17,4% 16,9% 51,5% 31,6% 22,8% 34,0% 43,2%
Median 77,6% 6,7% 13,7% 15,2% 52,2% 29,4% 20,5% 30,0% 43,9%
Original case 59,2% 15,5% 25,3% 27,5% 20,4% 52,1% 48,2% 6,9% 44,9%
Maximum 98,2% 85,1% 89,3% 71,4% 91,9% 82,6% 73,6% 91,0% 89,7%
Minimum 1,7% 0,2% 0,3% 1,4% 5,2% 2,0% 1,3% 1,9% 1,2%
Std. Dev. 0,17 0,09 0,14 0,09 0,17 0,16 0,12 0,19 0,19
Supply Demand Nominal Supply Demand Nominal Supply Demand Nominal
Mean 67,3% 13,5% 19,2% 17,7% 58,4% 23,9% 23,3% 54,7% 22,0%
Median 72,3% 9,7% 13,7% 15,4% 61,7% 19,6% 20,5% 57,9% 18,3%
Original case 94,12% 4,61% 1,27% 7,61% 49,48% 42,92% 13,47% 66,42% 20,11%
Maximum 97,7% 87,8% 92,4% 78,8% 92,1% 83,2% 81,9% 92,7% 87,3%
Minimum 1,3% 0,4% 0,2% 2,1% 4,9% 2,1% 2,2% 3,5% 2,0%
Std. Dev. 0,20 0,11 0,16 0,10 0,17 0,15 0,13 0,17 0,14
Supply Demand Nominal Supply Demand Nominal Supply Demand Nominal
Mean 50,1% 24,4% 25,5% 35,0% 41,2% 23,8% 35,7% 33,1% 31,2%
Median 52,8% 18,1% 21,6% 32,9% 38,6% 17,7% 33,8% 28,7% 27,4%
Original case 45,8% 18,1% 36,1% 61,3% 27,4% 11,2% 68,4% 13,8% 17,8%
Maximum 96,9% 91,2% 91,2% 84,5% 89,7% 84,0% 86,9% 90,7% 91,5%
Minimum 1,1% 0,4% 1,0% 1,5% 3,0% 0,9% 2,1% 1,7% 1,9%
Std. Dev. 0,23 0,19 0,17 0,18 0,21 0,17 0,18 0,19 0,18
Poland
Output Real Exchange Rate Nominal Exchange Rate
Hungary
Output Real Exchange Rate Nominal Exchange Rate
Czech Republic
Output Real Exchange Rate Nominal Exchange Rate
Trivariate vector is bootstrapped with 15000 replications. Shares refer to 12 periods ahead. VAR order is 12 
lags for the Czech Republic and Poland, and 13 for Hungary.
 
 




















5% 0,027 0,097 0,085 0,038 0,036 0,183 0,153 0,126 0,144
10% 0,055 0,221 0,172 0,081 0,075 0,369 0,288 0,234 0,285
15% 0,087 0,349 0,265 0,128 0,114 0,534 0,408 0,333 0,417
20% 0,126 0,457 0,352 0,176 0,155 0,660 0,509 0,424 0,534
25% 0,162 0,549 0,432 0,223 0,205 0,748 0,599 0,509 0,633
30% 0,206 0,629 0,507 0,271 0,259 0,810 0,679 0,586 0,717
35% 0,252 0,699 0,578 0,321 0,326 0,861 0,743 0,664 0,788
40% 0,305 0,759 0,653 0,374 0,399 0,898 0,796 0,737 0,848
45% 0,367 0,815 0,722 0,433 0,481 0,929 0,845 0,801 0,897
50% 0,430 0,862 0,782 0,500 0,569 0,953 0,887 0,860 0,936
55% 0,502 0,903 0,838 0,569 0,667 0,971 0,921 0,912 0,967
60% 0,583 0,940 0,890 0,641 0,768 0,985 0,949 0,950 0,986
65% 0,666 0,965 0,932 0,720 0,864 0,993 0,970 0,977 0,995
70% 0,758 0,983 0,968 0,801 0,940 0,998 0,985 0,993 0,998
75% 0,853 0,994 0,989 0,881 0,983 0,999 0,994 0,998 1,000
80% 0,934 0,999 0,998 0,945 0,998 1,000 0,999 1,000 1,000
85% 0,983 1,000 1,000 0,989 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
90% 0,998 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
95% 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
100% 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000










Czech Republic Hungary Poland
Symmetry versus Germany
a No Yes No
Maastricht Criteria:
Government deficit over GDP
b -12,60% -6,20% -3,90%
Government debt over GDP
c 37,80% 59,10% 45,40%
Inflation
d 1,80% 6,50% 2,50%
Long run interest rates
e 4,70% 8,10% 6,90%
ERM II participation No No No




Is the exchange rate a shock absorber? Maybe No Yes
Table 8: Summary of results
a: This criterion is borrowed from Camacho et alii (2005a).
b: Reference value is 3%. Data refer to 2003.
c: Reference value is 60%. Data refer to 2003.
d: Reference value is 2,4%, from September 2003 to August 2004.








Figure 1: Output growth
Germany










































Figure 2: Annual inflation
Germany

















































Figure 3: Nominal depreciation rate
Czech Republic





























Figure 4: Real exchange rate
Czech Republic









































Figure 5: Non-neutral versus neutral shocks
Impulse-responses from 2-variables SVAR
Czech Republic: Output responses

































Czech Republic: Exchange rate responses











Hungary: Exchange rate responses









Poland: Exchange rate responses













Figure 6: Supply, real demand and nominal shocks
Impulse-responses from 3-variables SVAR
Czech Republic: Output responses






































Czech Republic: Real exchange rate responses











Hungary: Real exchange rate responses












Poland: Real exchange rate responses










Czech Republic: Nominal exchange rate responses











Hungary: Nominal exchange rate responses













Poland: Nominal exchange rate responses
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